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Globalization and the
Shape of Things to Come
Keith Griffin

W

e are participants in a long march to a global economy. Since
the end of World War II, economic forces have been unleashed that are
creating the first worldwide economic system regulated largely by
market forces. Government-imposed restraints on the free flow of
trade, investment, and technology have diminished sharply, and a liberal international economic order has been created that has profound
implications for the future. Indeed, I contend that economic globalization is bound to affect not only the way we earn our living but also our
political institutions, the natural environment, and the pace of cultural
interchange.
Globalization is a consequence partly of policy changes, partly of
technological changes that have reduced the costs of integration, and
partly of the disintegration of the European, Japanese, and Russian
empires that had fragmented the world into separate spheres of influence. These processes have transformed the world economy in a
remarkably short period of time. World income and output since 1950
have grown about 3 percent a year, faster than at any time in recorded
history. World trade has grown more than twice as fast as this, and
individual countries have become much more receptive to external
influences. Between 1950 and 1996, for example, exports increased
from 7 percent of total global output to 21 percent.
Foreign direct investment grew half again as fast as foreign trade
and three times as fast as world output. Global financial investment in
stocks, bonds, and foreign currencies grew ten times as fast as world
output. No one born before 1914 could have witnessed such a high
speed of economic integration or such a high degree of integration.
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Is Globalization a New Phenomenon?
Skeptics might retort that only those ignorant of history could claim
that globalization is a new phenomenon. According to them, the present period of rapid integration should be seen as a return to the past,
and particularly to the economic conditions that prevailed in the second half of the nineteenth century and the first thirteen years of the
twentieth. Prior to World War I, international commerce was relatively
free, overseas investment was commonplace, and unlike today there
was widespread international migration of labor. The two world wars
and the Depression of the 1930s interrupted all this. Now, at last, we
are returning to the earlier trend of closer global economic integration.
While there is some truth to this skeptical view, several factors suggest that the process of globalization today is qualitatively different
from the processes operating in the nineteenth century. We must not
forget that a high proportion of the world’s population participated
only marginally in the earlier global economy. Because of the high cost
of transport and communication, countries experienced high levels of
“natural” protection, so the degree of economic integration was minimal. Furthermore, because most of the world’s population lived under
colonial regimes, trade and investment were regulated in the interest
of the imperial power.
Starting in 1947, with the decolonization of India and Pakistan, this
situation began to change radically. When China began to open its
economy in late 1978, another billion people — roughly one fifth of the
world’s population — became more closely integrated into the global
economy. The process continued with the disintegration of the USSR
in 1991, when another 400 million people were added. Thus, the spatial
dimension of globalization is much larger than in the past.
On the conceptual plane, too, globalization is much broader than
ever before. Indeed, it is virtually all embracing.1 The penetration of
market forces to every corner of the globe affects everything: our social
relations and politics, our culture, even our global climate. True,
human activity in the past has altered microclimates, reduced biological diversity, and resulted in the extinction of certain species, but the
effects usually were localized. Now, however, they often are generalized. Equally important, we lack institutions of global governance that,
at least in principle, would enable us to take collective action to correct
or mitigate the undesirable effects of globalization.
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How did this state of affairs arise? Let’s begin with policy-induced
liberalization. Since 1947, there have been eight rounds of global negotiations to reduce tariffs and other restrictions on international trade.
The most recent negotiations—in the so-called Uruguay round—were
completed in 1993. Initially, trade liberalization concentrated on manufactured goods and on trade among the rich countries. The results
have been highly successful; today, tariffs on manufactured goods
imported into rich countries are only about 4 percent on average.
Moreover, trade liberalization, which is now universal if not complete,
has gradually been extended to cover agricultural products as well as
services and to include the developing countries.
Restrictions on the international movement of capital were removed
more slowly. The United States generally eschewed capital controls
from the beginning, but capital controls were not abolished until 1979
in Britain, 1980 in Japan, and 1990 in France and Italy. Capital account
liberalization was even more gradual in the developing countries, but
after 1982, the process accelerated dramatically — in my opinion, too
rapidly, particularly in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa, where
liberalization was made a condition for international assistance to stabilization and restructuring programs. There has not been a comparable liberalization of the global labor market. On the contrary, policies
have become less liberal in recent years.
Technological changes have reinforced policy changes in fostering
globalization. The costs of freight and passenger transport, communications, and computing have fallen dramatically. As a result, the pattern of global production is changing beyond recognition. A product
may be designed in one country, its components produced in a second,
its parts assembled in a third, and the final product exported to a
fourth. Lower transport costs have reduced “natural” protection, and
this has greatly dispersed the location of production worldwide.
Indeed, labels of national origin on manufactured products are becoming meaningless.
Primary products, which are transport intensive, are of declining
relative importance in world trade, whereas trade in services and in
manufactured goods has grown rapidly. Some services — for example,
computer software — can be “shipped” over a telephone line, and containerization has greatly reduced the cost of shipping manufactured
goods. New technologies have reduced both space and time.
These new technologies also have helped render globalization irreversible. For example, electronic transfers of funds make it more diffi-
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cult for governments to reimpose capital controls, and the fax and email make it more difficult to restrict flows of information services.
The large volume of intra-firm trade within multinational corporations
and the ability of multinational corporations to shift resources readily
throughout the world hinder the reimposition of trade barriers.
Clearly, globalization and liberalization are with us for the foreseeable
future.
Asymmetrical Liberalization
Whether we like it or not, we live in a liberal world where markets are
given free rein — except for one curious asymmetry. There are free
flows internationally of primary commodities, manufactured goods,
and many services. There are free flows of technology and intellectual
property rights. And there are free flows of capital. The flow of labor,
however, is severely restricted, and the rich countries are becoming
not more liberal but less so.
In this respect, globalization is moving backwards. There was a time
when international migration was massive and forced. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Atlantic slave trade resulted in the
deaths of more than 50 million Africans and the importation of some
15 million slaves into North America, the Caribbean islands, and
Brazil. In the nineteenth century, between 10 and 40 million indentured workers, mostly from China and India, were transported around
the world, usually to colonial territories where labor was scarce. In the
second half of that century and the first decades of this one, there was
massive but free migration from Europe: 60 million people left that
continent for the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand,
South Africa, and parts of Latin America.
Since the early 1970s, however, the global labor market has become
less free. Controls over immigration have been tightened, the annual
flows of immigrants into the rich countries have declined, and a bias
against the migration of low-skilled labor has become entrenched.
There is a fragmented global market for high-skilled workers, technicians, and professionals, but there is no real, legal global market for
low-skilled workers. The result in the United States, for example, is
that the foreign born account for a much smaller proportion of the U.S.
population today (9.3%) than they did a century ago (about 15%).
Restrictions on the movement of workers make no economic sense.
Greater international labor mobility, particularly of low-skilled labor,
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would benefit everyone, host countries and sending countries alike.
This greater mobility would raise total output and incomes in the rich
host countries. It would increase efficient use of the world’s resources
in rich and poor countries alike. It would foster entrepreneurship, reinvigorate the economies of Western Europe and Japan, and help sustain
growth in North America. It would stimulate the creation of small
businesses on which the health of economies depends. It would
increase savings, investment, and human-capital formation in the rich
countries, while increasing the flow of remittances to poor countries.
And it would accelerate the pace of innovation. The combination of all
these factors would accelerate the growth of average incomes in both
rich countries and poor.
Think of the growth of Western Europe in the 1960s, the growth of
the Middle East in the 1970s, and the growth in the United States in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. All these periods of
rapid growth were fueled by large-scale immigration. Indeed, the
United States could not have developed at the speed it did without the
enormous contribution of foreign labor.2
Finally, for those of you worried about social security entitlements
in your old age, immigration would alleviate the economic problems
associated with the aging population in rich countries. By reducing the
dependency ratio — that is, by raising the ratio of active workers to
retired people — immigration permits a lower tax burden on the
employed population or a higher level of state-financed pensions, or
both. Hence, the elderly should be strong defenders of free labor markets.
What, then, is the problem about immigration? Why all the fuss?
The advocates of restricting the mobility of labor usually posit three
arguments.
First, they claim that migration increases unemployment. But this is
simply not true. Most migrants enter low-wage occupations that are
not attractive to the indigenous population, so they rarely compete
directly with local labor. Furthermore, a high proportion of migrants
create their own jobs by becoming self-employed. Most important, by
stimulating growth, migration actually reduces unemployment rather
than increases it. It is a fallacy to think that the number of jobs is fixed
and that migrant workers deprive local workers of a livelihood. Demagogues exploit this fear, but the truth is that migrants create jobs for
themselves and for others that previously did not exist.
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Second, it is claimed that migration increases inequality. While it
can be argued that immigration lowers the wages in the host country
of some categories of low-skilled labor and accentuates inequality in
the distribution of income, the quantitative effect is slight. In particular, the huge rise in recent years in economic inequality in the United
States, Western Europe, and the once-socialist countries associated
with the former Soviet Union has almost nothing to do with the migration of labor. To scapegoat migrants for the injustices of our societies is
patently wrong. In fact, an effective way to increase equality would be
to welcome measures that create a more liberal labor market internationally. From a world perspective, migration reduces global inequality rather than increases it, so the egalitarians among us should
staunchly advocate open borders.
Third, it is claimed that migration increases the tax burden.
Although true at some times and in some places, this proposition generally is false. Most migrants are of prime working age, neither very
young nor old. Thus, they place few demands on public education,
public health services, or state old-age pensions. In fact, on balance
migrants tend to pay more in taxes than they receive in benefits. The
fiscally prudent, therefore, should be avid supporters of free labor
markets.
One of the consequences of globalization is that, whether one supports or opposes greater freedom of movement, not much can be done
about it. Migration is a response to very powerful market forces.
Falling costs of travel and rising incomes in the developing countries
have made migration much easier, and widening income differentials
between rich countries and poor have made it more attractive. The
incentives to migrate are strong, and measures to nullify those incentives are costly and ineffective. Because many borders are porous, it
has proved futile to erect fences, conduct lengthy checks at crossing
points, floodlight illegal routes of entry, and send troops to patrol
those routes. “Why waste resources trying to prevent what is good for
us when we know we’re bound to fail in any case?” is a reasonable
question to ask, given the circumstances.
I conclude, then, that fewer restrictions on immigration would benefit everyone, that the alleged harmful effects of migration are greatly
exaggerated, and that policies intended to prevent immigration, at
least in this country, merely squander taxpayers’ money. Perhaps good
sense will eventually prevail, and if so, the migration situation will differ substantially from the one that exists today.
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Globalization and Economic Space
Let’s now consider the economic consequences of globalization. Has it
produced prosperity? Has it reduced global inequality? Has it affected
all regions of the globe similarly?
Viewed from outer space, economic prosperity has indeed
increased substantially during recent decades. The world’s per capita
income rose about 1.2 percent a year from 1965 to 1996.3 Seen in historical perspective, this represents a rapid growth of the world economy.
Compare this with Angus Maddison’s, estimate that, between 1400
and 1820, world GDP per capita increased only 0.07 percent a year.4
It is widely believed that globalization has been accompanied by
greater inequality in the distribution of the world’s income. The facts
are unclear and the causal relationships are not well understood, but
one way of looking at the issue is to divide the world into three groups,
each classified by average income per head. The World Bank has followed this convention for several years, and it is somewhat analogous
to dividing society into three classes — of low-, middle-, and upperincome groups. According to this classification, during the period
1965 – 96, average incomes in the low-income countries increased 3.1
percent a year compared to 2.2 percent a year in the high-income countries; in the middle-income countries, average income increased only
0.9 percent a year. That is, growth rates were bimodally distributed
across countries classified by level of per capita income. The poorest
countries grew faster than the richest, so, in this sense, global inequality diminished.5
But this is slightly misleading because inequality within the group
of low-income countries increased dramatically. The countries of subSaharan Africa experienced a decline in average incomes ( – 0.2% a
year), whereas the two largest and poor Asian countries, China and
India, enjoyed much faster growth (6.7% and 2.3% a year, respectively). This illustrates the more general point that growth has been
distributed very unevenly among the major regions of the developing
world. Growth rates were negative not only in sub-Saharan Africa but
also in the Middle East and North Africa ( – 1.8% a year) and in the exsocialist developing countries of Europe and Central Asia ( – 1.3% a
year). In Latin America and the Caribbean, the rate of growth was positive but rather low (1.1% a year), whereas in South Asia (2.2% a year),
growth was twice as fast as in Latin America; in East Asia and the
Pacific (5.5% a year), it was five times as fast.
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These large variations in long-term growth rates cannot be attributed entirely to the processes of global integration and liberalization.
The decline in incomes in the ex-socialist countries arises in the first
instance from the political collapse of the former Soviet Union. The
transition from central planning to a more market-oriented economic
system and the reintegration of the Soviet bloc countries into the world
economy often were handled poorly, but this has little to do with globalization. China, after all, handled the processes of transition and reintegration smoothly and experienced no fall in income; on the contrary,
growth accelerated.6 The same is true of Vietnam. Similarly, the steep
decline of average incomes in the Middle East and North Africa
reflects the political turmoil in the regions (civil conflict in Algeria,
wars in Iraq, Iran, and Kuwait) at least as much as falling oil prices. Yet
only the latter is connected directly to economic globalization.
Falling incomes in sub-Saharan Africa and the slow growth of
incomes in Latin America can more plausibly be linked to globalization. The debt crisis of the 1980s hit these two regions particularly
hard, and the recovery from the crisis-induced depressions was slow
and difficult. And in many parts of Africa, various civil conflicts
greatly aggravated the region’s economic difficulties.
At the other end of the spectrum, East Asia clearly experienced the
best growth performance, until 1997. Indeed, many commentators cite
East Asia as evidence that globalization is a powerful force for economic progress. But just as globalization cannot be blamed entirely for
one region’s failure, nor can it solely be credited for another’s success.
There is much more to East Asia’s outstanding economic performance
than trade liberalization, low exchange rates, and exploitation of its
comparative advantage in labor-intensive exports of manufactured
goods.7 Major land reforms were introduced in several countries in the
region (China, South Korea, Taiwan), and several others (including
Hong Kong and Singapore) began the development process with a reasonably equitable distribution of income. East Asia also emphasized
human-capital formation — notably basic education and health services — and this contributed both to rapid growth and low inequality.
Rates of physical-capital formation were high, and this investment was
financed largely by domestic savings instead of foreign capital. In
other words, “domestic” economic factors were at least as important as
“global” factors in explaining East Asia’s success.
So far, we have concentrated on the spatial distribution of the outcomes of globalization — namely, on variations in economic growth.
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Now, we’ll examine the global forces that affect these outcomes. The
two most important are flows of international capital, particularly foreign direct investment, and international trade in goods and services.
Despite the liberalization of global capital markets, foreign investment is rather small. In rich countries, it accounts for only about 6 percent of total investment. Most investment continues to be financed by
domestic savings. Despite the great scarcity of capital in developing
countries and its apparent abundance in rich countries, the largest
recipient of foreign direct investment is the United States. In fact, most
foreign investment consists of one rich country investing in another
rich country. Roughly 60 percent of all foreign direct investment circulates among the small number of rich countries; only 40 percent is
directed to the large number of poor countries that account for 85 percent of the world’s population.
Within this large group of developing countries, most foreign
investment is directed to the middle-income countries. In 1995, for
example, the low-income countries received only 43.5 percent of the
foreign direct investment that was channeled to developing countries.
Moreover, one country, China, received 86.4 percent of all the foreign
capital invested in low-income countries. In other words, most poor
countries received virtually no foreign capital.8
Despite the liberalization of the world’s capital markets, foreign
investment has not become an engine of growth in the poor countries.
If anything, flows of foreign capital, because they are concentrated in
the rich countries, have helped to widen global inequalities. Foreign
investment does not flow to countries where capital is “scarce” in a
physical sense; rather, it flows to countries where expected profits are
high. Foreign direct investment is, therefore, most likely to be attracted
to developing countries with rich mineral deposits (especially oil) or to
those that have achieved rapid growth of exports (particularly manufacturing exports).9 In other words, countries that already enjoy a rapid
rate of growth of total output and income tend to attract foreign investments.10 In summary, foreign direct investment, is not a cause of
growth but a consequence of it.
The same is true, broadly speaking, of foreign trade. Most of the
world’s trade consists of exports from one rich country to another. The
high-income countries currently account for more than three-quarters
of total world merchandise exports. The share of the developing countries is less than 22 percent and the share of sub-Saharan Africa and
South Asia combined is a paltry 2.4 percent. Because most of the very
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poor countries are out of the trade loop, they are effectively delinked
from the global economy.
During the first half of this decade, the volume of world trade grew
6.0 percent a year. Merchandise exports originating in the high-income
countries grew somewhat less rapidly than this — specifically, 5.4 percent a year — indicating that the rest of the world was becoming more
closely integrated into the global economy. This was especially true of
East and South Asia, where exports increased 17.8 percent and 8.6 percent a year, respectively. In sub-Saharan Africa and in the Middle East
and North Africa, however, trade increased only about 1 percent a
year. Not surprisingly, these two regions are becoming increasingly
marginalized.
Thus, the forces propelling globalization — trade and investment —
have made a very uneven spatial impact. The rich countries have participated fully in the process, and the middle-income countries are
becoming increasingly integrated into the global system. But among
the low-income countries, only China has become a large recipient of
foreign capital and a major trading nation. Most poor countries have
benefited neither from a rapid growth of exports nor from a large
inflow of foreign investment. The most important economic consequence of globalization in these countries has been the exodus of much
of their human capital through the emigration of professional, technical, and managerial personnel.
The Squeeze on the State
The processes of globalization, positive and negative, have enormous
implications for politics and for our dominant political institution, the
territorial state. The state as an economic entity is being squeezed from
above by the forces of globalization and from below by the forces of
subnationalist and ethnic politics.11 The creation of a unified global economic system is eroding the state’s ability to manage its domestic
economy—that is, to impose its will on enterprises with subsidiaries in
a number of countries, on investors with access to international capital
markets, and on employed people with internationally marketable
skills. Increased mobility of goods and services, assets, and individuals
has made it increasingly difficult for the state to impose its authority
on persons and entities that, in principle, fall under its jurisdiction.
Just as the state of Minnesota, within the context of the U.S. economy, has limited freedom of action in economic affairs, so too one can
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imagine a time when, say, Canada, within the context of a global economy, will have lost much of its power to regulate its own economy.
The state as the locus of economic control may be slowly withering
away. The French learned during the Mitterand government that Keynesian macroeconomic policy no longer is possible in one country. The
Thais have recently learned that exchange-rate policy in a globally
integrated economy is severely constrained. Most central bankers
know that integration of world bond markets limit their ability to
lower interest rates. Microeconomic policy is similarly constrained. For
example, the ability of large firms to locate their fixed investment
almost anywhere in the world has reduced the power of the state to
regulate industry, be it through taxation, the imposition of minimumwage legislation, environmental controls, health and safety provisions,
or anything else.
In some cases, however, globalization affects not so much what governments do as how they do it. Consider taxation, for example. The relatively greater mobility of capital, as compared to labor, has shifted the
burden of taxation in the rich countries from capital to labor. Within
the capital category, governments have an incentive to tax fixed capital
and immobile natural capital (land, real estate, mineral deposits) more
highly than internationally mobile financial capital. Indeed, governments often offer subsidies to attract financial capital. And within the
labor category, governments have tended to reduce the marginal rates
of income taxation on high-income earners (who are internationally
more mobile), while actually increasing effective tax rates on less
mobile ordinary wage earners. Thus, globalization has had a discriminatory effect by weakening the state’s ability to impose or increase certain types of taxation.
Even the ability of the state to police its own frontiers is being
undermined. Smuggling of goods into and out of countries is commonplace and occurs on a massive scale. In some African countries, it
is thought that more than half of international trade consists of smuggled goods. The most notorious example of the inability of the state to
control the production and trade of commodities is, of course, narcotic
drugs. In many parts of Latin America and Southeast Asia, the illegal
production of drugs accounts for a significant proportion of total output, most of which is exported. Indeed, it is estimated that the retail
value of trade in illegal drugs is second only to the weapons trade and
actually exceeds international trade in oil.
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The flow of “bads” is equally difficult to control. Pollution no longer
respects international boundaries. In some cases, pollution threatens
the globe as a whole (as in the rise in average global temperature
caused by burning fossil fuels); in other cases, it affects numerous
countries in a specific region (as in the explosion of a nuclear power
plant in Chernobyl, Ukraine); and in still other cases, pollution may
affect a single neighboring country (as with air pollution from power
stations coming down as acid rain hundreds of miles away). Globalization, in other words, implies not only the universal dissemination of
goods but also the dissemination of “bads.”
Lastly, the state also is losing control over the flow of labor across its
borders. Now that it is cheaper and faster than ever before for people
to move from one country to another, they are doing so in the millions.
Most migration, contrary to popular perception, consists of poor people moving from one low-income country to another, often as refugees
or as irregular, unrecorded illegal migrants. Despite strenuous efforts,
the state can do little about these flows of people; in the end, there may
be no alternative but to accept the situation, declare an amnesty, and
regularize the position of the irregular migrants.
In summary, slowly but surely, globalization is weakening the economic sovereignty of states. Freedom of maneuver has diminished,
and policy mistakes can be severely punished by global market forces.
Increased mobility of enterprises, assets, and individuals has made it
easier for economic agents to escape controls or at least to mitigate
them. And when attempts are made to prohibit an activity, as with
trade in narcotic drugs or the immigration of labor, the outcome is
rarely the end of the activity but, rather, its transfer to the underground economy.
In addition to the forces of globalization coming from above, the
state is being squeezed from below by other forces that can loosely be
described as subnationalism, which challenges the political legitimacy
of existing states and threatens their territorial integrity. Examples
include the separation of Bangladesh from Pakistan and of Eritrea
from Ethiopia; the disintegration of the former Soviet Union into fifteen independent states; the continuing disintegration of the former
Yugoslavia; and the growth of separatist movements in numerous
states, including Indonesia, the Philippines, India, Sri Lanka, and the
Sudan. Cases can also be found of nationalist movements that cut
across existing state boundaries and that aspire to create a new state of
their own from portions of existing states. The movements for Irish
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reunification, greater Serbia, and a greater Kurdistan (potentially
absorbing territory from Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey) are obvious
examples.
These movements can be viewed in various ways — as perhaps
inspired by nationalist, ethnic, or cultural demands—but at their heart
is a search for community or identity different from the community or
identity offered by shared citizenship in an existing state. In some
cases, subnationalist movements center on differences in language and
culture, as in the Basque movement in Spain, the conflict between the
Flamands and Walloons in Belgium, and the separatist movement in
Quebec, Canada. In other cases, the search for community has
revolved around a resurgence of religious identity; examples include
the separatist movement by the Sikhs in northwestern India and the
revival of Islam in many parts of the world. And in still other cases,
broader “ethnic” demands have become a source of conflict, as in
many parts of sub-Saharan Africa, in Central America, and in the
Andean region of South America.
How should one interpret the rise of ethnicity as a political force?
First, it is evident that ethnicity can undermine state power and pose a
threat from below to the legitimacy of existing states. Second, subnationalist movements can be intolerant of outsiders, narrow and exclusive, socially divisive, and sources of communal strife. At their best,
however, they can be inclusive and sharing; they can encourage strong
loyalties and commitment; and they can permit a high degree of participation in the life of the community. Subnationalist movements can
create an opportunity for more self-determination — enabling people
to choose the polity under which they wish to live — and can expand
personal and group freedoms. These are, of course, welcome outcomes. But I contend that, if taken to an extreme, subnationalist politics are doomed to failure: the construction of a community around a
homogeneous culture is neither possible nor desirable.
Subnationalist political movements, if they attain their objectives,
are likely to lead to smaller political units—that is, loose federations in
large states or an increase in the number of small states. It is indeed the
reduction in scale of the polity that permits greater participatory
democracy. The possibility of a trade-off between the political desirability of small states and a loss of economic efficiency forces us to consider whether small states are likely to suffer from diseconomies of
scale.
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There are two areas where one can plausibly argue that small states
are at an economic disadvantage — namely, in providing the basic
machinery of government and in supplying defense services. Every
country needs a head of state, an array of ministries, a tax-collecting
bureaucracy, a central bank, and so on. The costs of providing these
essential services may well rise less than proportionately as the size of
the state increases. Particularly in very small states, including many
islands in the South Pacific and the Caribbean, the costs may be disproportionately high. In other words, there may be a range over which
there are economies of scale in public administration. If so, very small
states will be at an economic disadvantage.
Small states are also at a disadvantage compared to large ones when
it comes to military expenditure and warfare. This does not mean that
all small states are incapable of defending themselves (Switzerland
suggests otherwise), or that no small state can defeat a major power
(Vietnam has shown that it can be done), or that all small states need
armed forces (Costa Rica has survived and prospered without an
army). But if military power is an objective, large states enjoy an economic advantage in the form of lower unit costs.
In addition, economies of scale in production put small countries at
an economic disadvantage to the extent that they rely on their domestic market. Here, however, globalization comes to the aid of subnationalist forces. Liberalization of economic transactions and the creation of
an integrated global market make it easier for small states to exploit
economies of scale in production. Globalization means that small
states need not pay a penalty in the form of reduced efficiency and
lower incomes. Similarly, national alliances, collective security, and
international mechanisms for keeping the peace — if they are credible
— provide alternative ways for small states to achieve a degree of military security.
In other words, globalization is reducing the economic disadvantages of small states. It also has made smaller states politically more
attractive to many subnationalist groups. That the costs of smallness
are falling and the perceived benefits are rising implies that the
squeeze on existing states is likely to continue. Processes of globalization are becoming increasingly compatible with the search for identity
based on smaller communities.
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Global Governance
If one accepts the argument that globalization has reduced the ability
of the state to manage economic affairs, then we must reconsider our
institutions for global governance. It does not follow automatically
that if the state is weaker, global institutions should be strengthened. It
is possible to imagine an alternative response in which groups of countries come together to create strong regional institutions. Indeed, this is
happening in the European Community, and it is conceivable that
something similar could occur in Southeast Asia and parts of Latin
America. One can also imagine a multilayered system of governance
beginning with global institutions but embracing regional and state
institutions, as well as institutions of provincial and local government.
Great Britain, for example, has decided simultaneously to become
more closely integrated into the European Community and to devolve
some authority now held by the central government to newly created
institutions in Scotland and Wales. In such a multilayered system, it
should be possible to locate responsibility at that layer of governance
where economies of scale are exhausted. In Europe, this is called the
principle of subsidiarity.
Thus, we are not talking about world government but, rather, about
a set of institutions at the global level that are needed to manage the
forces of globalization. Our existing system of global governance
emerged higgledy-piggledy in response to a series of crises and global
events, foremost among which were World War I, World War II, the
collapse of imperialism, and the associated dramatic increase in the
number of newly independent countries. The linchpin of the present
system is the United Nations Organization, headquartered in New
York.
Although it was the moving spirit behind the creation of the U.N.
and to this day has the dominant position within the organization, the
United States in the last two decades has had an ambivalent attitude
toward international multilateral cooperation. On the one hand, the
United States remains committed in principle to multilateral solutions
to global problems and is quick to use the U.N. when it serves its purposes to do so, as in the recent confrontation with Iraq over weapons
inspection. On the other hand, the United States has so far refused to
pay the $1.5 billion it owes to the U.N., and is demanding that its share
of the regular budget be reduced by a fifth (from 25% to 20%). The
United States has not hesitated to act unilaterally when it was conve-
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nient to do so (for example, when it disregarded the dispute-resolution
procedures of the World Trade Organization, and it has twice withdrawn from two major specialized agencies (the International Labour
Organization and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization).
This behavior has put the United States at odds with the vast majority of other member countries, undermined the cohesion of the organization, and seriously eroded the financial viability of the entire United
Nations system. Precisely at a time when globalization has increased
the need for an effective system of global governance, the ability of our
existing institutions to undertake collective action on a global scale has
been reduced. Only anarchists and nihilists can be content with this
state of affairs. The combination of an enfeebled system of global governance and a growing number of states that find it increasingly difficult to manage their economies is almost certain to result in periodic
crises and poor performance over the long haul. Reforms are essential.
The question is: What sorts of reforms are most urgently needed?
First, our institutions of global governance should be more democratic. The present system of voting is a bizarre and indefensible mixture in which the five countries which happened to be on the winning
side at the end of World War II have a veto in the Security Council; in
the General Assembly, each state has the same vote and influence
whether its population is less than one million people or more than
one billion; and in the International Monetary Fund and World Bank,
votes are weighted by a country’s financial contribution. Something
more closely approximating the principle of one person, one vote is
needed to confer political legitimacy on our global institutions.
Second, the finances of our global institutions must be given secure
foundations. Budgetary contributions should be based on agreed-upon
principles, payment should be punctual and obligatory, and a mechanism for enforcement should be created that includes penalties for
noncompliance. A clause in the United Nations charter deprives a
country of its vote in the General Assembly if it does not adhere to the
financial rules and is two years or more in arrears. But this clause has
never been applied. At the very least, it should be strictly enforced.
Third, global governance should be based increasingly on the rule
of law. States should be bound by their international commitments and
should be prevented from oscillating between multilateralism and unilateralism whenever it suits them. Disputes should be settled by the
International Court of Justice or by specialized tribunals created for the
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purpose, and judgments should be binding on all parties. It is highly
regrettable that the United States, along with a small number of other
countries, recently refused to support the creation of a permanent
international court of criminal justice.
Fourth, serious consideration should be given to the proposal of the
previous Secretary-General to create a small but permanent United
Nations peacekeeping and peacemaking force. Interventions in conflict
situations have so far been on an ad hoc basis and have largely
depended on the political interests of one or more of the major powers
rather than on the intrinsic merits of the case. We need a global police
force that is accountable to the global community as a whole. This is
especially true today as the distinction between internal and external
conflicts ceases to be meaningful: refugees from civil conflicts spill
across international borders, armed bands seek temporary sanctuary
in adjacent territories, neighboring countries get drawn into the conflict, one or more of the great powers intervenes, and the United
Nations is then summoned to clean up the mess. Surely we can do better than this.
These issues of global governance are connected to the size of the
state. The design of mechanisms that reduce the likelihood of armed
conflict and increase security, the creation of more effective global
organizations, and the continuation of economic liberalization all permit a small size of state, when that is what people desire.
Turning to issues of economic governance, I wish to make a few
additional points.12 First, it is evident that the International Monetary
Fund is much too small to act as a world central bank and lender of last
resort. The elimination of controls over international trade and capital
account transactions is bound to result in periods of instability, and
there is a danger that instability in one country will be transferred to
another. In fact, we are witnessing this today. The demand on the
resources of the IMF to finance short-term stabilization programs is
certain to increase. But recent evidence from Mexico to South Korea,
Indonesia, and Russia reveals that the funds available to the IMF are
woefully inadequate. Increasingly the resources the IMF can lend to a
country have had to be supplemented by funds from the United States
and other countries. In the 1997 stabilization program in South Korea,
for example, the IMF provided less than 40 percent of the total funds
required—$21 billion out of a total of $55 billion; the rest was provided
by the World Bank ($10 billion), the Asian Development Bank ($4 billion), and seven individual countries, led by Japan ($10 billion) and the
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United States ($5 billion). This need to rely on multiple sources of
financing weakens the authority and autonomy of the IMF and injects
an external political element into decisions about what countries to
assist, how much funding to provide, and what policy conditions to
impose. None of this is desirable, and I believe a strong case can be
made for a very substantial increase in the resources of the IMF. At the
same time, the IMF must be reformed and become less secretive about
its policies and more accountable for its actions.
Second, the World Bank and the various regional development
banks may have outlived their usefulness. Foreign aid in all its forms is
shrinking and has become dwarfed by international flows of private
capital. The world market for long-term capital is functioning reasonably well, and profitable projects quite readily attract private capital.
True, private foreign capital does not flow in large amounts to the
poorest developing countries, but their needs can best be met by direct
transfers of grants rather than through loans on favorable terms. The
time has come to privatize the World Bank and the other intergovernmental financial-aid agencies.
If we do this, it will be necessary to create a new mechanism for providing foreign assistance to the lowest-income countries to replace the
dying conventional aid programs. One possibility would be a pure
international tax-and-transfer mechanism. Resources could be raised
through a low and mildly progressive international income tax on the
gross national product of high-income countries. These resources
would then be disbursed automatically through a negative income tax.
That is, foreign assistance would be distributed to low-income countries in inverse proportion to the recipients’ income per head. Such a
scheme would ensure that the burden of foreign assistance is equitably
distributed among the rich countries, that the available funds are distributed among eligible poor countries in accordance with their need,
and that foreign assistance is insulated from the political, commercial,
and other interests of rich countries.
A separate mechanism is needed to facilitate mutually beneficial
intergovernmental transactions when the global market mechanism
works poorly. Examples include environmental programs in developing countries that are at least partially beneficial to developed countries: the management of the global commons in Antarctica, the oceans,
and outer space; and public-health measures in developing countries
designed to prevent the spread of the AIDS epidemic and other communicable diseases such as tuberculosis. There are numerous cases
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where economic and technological globalization generate “externalities” and “free-rider” problems, particularly (but not exclusively) for
the environment. Where there are cases of “market failure,” alternative
institutions will have to be created to facilitate the negotiation of
advantageous agreements and monitor the results.13 When an agreement includes side payments for services rendered by one party to
another, provision also will have to be made for the transfer of funds.
Lastly, we need to strengthen rule-based systems governing international economic intercourse. If liberalism is to be taken seriously,
countries must be discouraged from acting arbitrarily and unilaterally
and harming the interests of their trading partners. An example of
unilateral action is the proliferation of antidumping measures in some
countries as a disguised form of protection, now that tariffs have been
reduced to very low levels. In 1996, there were 311 antidumping measures in force in the United States and 153 in the European Union; at
the other extreme, only three antidumping measures were in force in
Japan, two in Singapore, and none in Chile. A mechanism is needed to
enforce good behavior and to provide compensation for damages
when one country breaks the rules of the game and inflicts economic
injury on another.
In other words, the principles that govern economic intercourse
within a country should be extended worldwide. Discrimination
against workers on the grounds of race, for example, is illegal in many
countries, but there is a legal remedy: the injured party may take the
offender to court and claim substantial damages. In the international
arena, however, there is no effective remedy when one country arbitrarily violates the rules of good conduct. The new World Trade Organization does contain some provision for compensation, but the
coverage is narrow and the process of adjudication slow and cumbersome. Much more must be done.
Globalization, Culture, and Development: The Long View
Globalization has major implications for economics, politics, and institutional transformation. It also has implications for culture and the
ways cultures interact and adapt to changing circumstances.14 Some
analysts claim to observe the emergence of a global culture and the
spread of Western values, political forms of organization, and ways of
life. I believe this view is too simple and deserves careful examination.
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Defining culture broadly as “ways of life” helps to highlight several
notable features of the contemporary world. First, there are, of course,
many ways of life that one can observe. Some are geographically
restricted whereas some cultures span vast areas. Indeed, there are
more ways of life, or more cultures, than there are states. One obvious
implication of this is that cultures and states do not coincide; the jurisdiction of territorial states does not “map” the space occupied by distinct cultures. This lack of coincidence creates the possibility of
conflicting allegiances, divided loyalties, and contested claims for primacy of affection. It is also a source of pressure from below on the
state.
Second, the cultures one observes today are almost always older
than any existing state. In fact, the contemporary state is a relatively
recent institutional innovation, dating roughly from the eighteenth
century in Europe, and most actual states were created in the twentieth
century after the disintegration of the worldwide imperial system.
Most cultures antedate the emergence of the state system and the
nationalism and patriotism associated with it. This does not imply that
cultures are necessarily ancient, traditional, or static, much less that
they are timeless. On the contrary, cultures should be seen as changing, dynamic, fluid. Paradoxically, they are simultaneously young and
old; they represent distinctive ways of life, yet they are influenced by
other cultures with which they come into contact.
Third, cultures often are transnational phenomena. Geographically,
they frequently transcend the boundaries of territorial states. This
obviously is true of Arab culture in the Middle East, of many African
cultures divided by arbitrary boundaries during the colonial period, of
Western culture, of Chinese culture in East and Southeast Asia, and so
on. Cultures thus pose, or are perceived to pose, both an external challenge to some states and a risk, perhaps only a latent risk, of internal
subversion.
Fourth, virtually all states include within their boundaries a multiplicity of cultures. Indeed, the term “nation-state” is a misnomer. Modern states include a large number of national groups, ethnicities,
“tribes,” languages, and religions — in other words, ways of life. The
modern state is irreversibly a multicultural institution. Pluralism is a
fact of life of the contemporary world, a fact that has yet to be properly
digested by analysts and policy-makers alike. Some states (Israel, Pakistan, Iran) behave as if they contained a homogenous population of
uniform religious belief; few states (Switzerland is an obvious excep-
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tion) have constructed institutions that explicitly take into account the
linguistic, religious, and ethnic diversity of their citizens.
There are, of course, conflicting views of the role of multiculturalism within states. At one end of the spectrum are those who consider
pluralism a disadvantage. They deem diversity a source of conflict that
often leads to violence and bloodshed, results in political instability,
and makes it difficult for people to get along together in their daily life.
Multiculturalism is something that must be contained or managed,
preferably by making “them” as much like “us” as possible. Far from
contributing to economic growth and human development, cultural
diversity is an obstacle to overcome or circumvent.
At the other end of the spectrum are those who regard cultural
diversity not as a liability but as an asset. Different ways of life, of
looking at the world, of thinking are indeed challenging and a source
of dissonance and tension that can lead to conflict and violence. But
those challenges and tensions are also a source of creativity, and creativity is the fountainhead of economic growth and human development. New knowledge, new technology, and new institutional
arrangements are the ultimate sources of growth and human betterment, and cultural diversity acts as a stimulus to innovative activities
of all sorts. That is, one can view cultures as “experiments” that are
sources of knowledge. The more experiments humanity conducts —
that is, the greater the cultural diversity — the more knowledgeable
and innovative we are likely to be.
It has long been recognized that minorities often are highly innovative in business, and account for a disproportionate number of entrepreneurs. Think of the Chinese in Southeast Asia, the Lebanese in West
Africa, the Indians in East Africa, and the Quakers in the United Kingdom. The claim being made here, however, is more general — that pluralism contributes to creativity in all fields of endeavor. If this is true,
then multicultural states ultimately have more potential than states
with a relatively homogeneous population. A potential for material
and human progress does not, of course, imply that this potential
inevitably will be realized; the translation of potential into actual
achievement depends on whether, in a particular time and place, the
advantages of pluralism can be exploited positively and the disadvantages minimized. At any given moment, some culturally homogeneous
societies (e.g., Japan, South Korea) may appear on balance to be less
divisive and more dynamic than some pluralist societies, but eventually pluralism probably will be more advantageous than homogeneity.
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Cultural diversity is, of course, much greater at the global than at
the state level. It might have been possible at one time to imagine cultures as being separated from one another — with room to breathe and
to develop independently — but technological change in transport and
communications has, for centuries, been dissolving time and space,
breaking down the barriers that surround even the most isolated cultures. This process has accelerated dramatically in the last fifty years
and is part of a wider tendency toward globalization. One consequence of globalization is that cultures are coming into closer contact
with one another. The Chinese culture rubs against the Indian culture,
the Indian culture rubs against the European culture, and so on. This
“rubbing” of cultures is not a question of physical proximity; strictly
speaking, cultures do not have fixed boundaries. It is, rather, particular
cultural attributes that rub against one another, creating heterogeneous
cultures, hybrids.
Admittedly, closer cultural contact has historically been a mixed
blessing. Whether one considers the explosive conquests of Islam
beginning in the seventh century, which from the epicenter in Arabia
covered the whole of the Middle East, all of North Africa, and the Iberian peninsula in Europe, or the westward migration of the Mongol
“hordes” of the thirteenth century, which ended at the Danube River
and the outskirts of Budapest, or the unrelenting expansion of Western
Europe from the fifteenth century onward to virtually every corner of
the globe, cultural interchange often seems more like a one-way street
than a two-lane highway. Cultural contact, frequently a by-product of
military encounters, has been associated with violence, conquest, and
imperialism. It has introduced alien diseases to those who had no natural resistance to them. It has helped spread racism. Occasionally, it
has resulted in genocide. More often, it has led to the destruction of
pre-existing social structures and the system of beliefs that sustained
them. Historically, globalization often has had a fatal impact.
The other side of the story, however, is more positive. Contacts
between cultures led to myriad exchanges and adaptations that benefited all parties. Consider foodstuffs and primary commodities. Latin
America gave us maize, potatoes, the tomato, and natural rubber;
Ethiopia and Yemen gave us coffee; India gave us sugar; China gave us
tea and noodles (which the Italians transformed into pasta); and so on.
The world’s pharmacopoeia similarly draws on botanical products
from many different regions. The same is true of our domesticated animals. Early Chinese science led the world in the field of technology,
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and China gave us paper, porcelain (or fine “china”), the compass,
gunpowder, and much else. The Arabs gave us our system of numerals. The Central Asians gave us algebra and taught us how to measure
the motions of the heavens. India gave us Buddhism; the Arabian
Peninsula, Islam; and Palestine, Christianity. Mutual influences in art
and architecture, music and dance, crafts and household technology
are too numerous to recount. All of the world’s cultures have been
immeasurably enriched by contact with others.
Similar processes can be observed today. The difference between
now and then is that globalization has made cultural interchange more
frequent than in the past, deeper, and more rapid. Some have speculated that the emerging “global culture” will submerge local cultures
under an irresistible tide of Western influence. Culture worldwide is
becoming more homogeneous: Coca-Cola, blue jeans, and North
American popular music dominate. Local dialects and even entire languages are disappearing, local cuisines are being replaced by Westernstyle fast foods, and traditional ways of life are being abandoned in
favor of ersatz American ways. Although there is some truth to this
speculation, cultural interchange in the modern world is a two-way
exchange. As we have seen, capital, technology, and even labor circulate globally. Science is more universal and widely accessible than ever
before. Ideas, information, and knowledge are transmitted much more
rapidly and over a greater area than in the past. The result is an
increase in diversity: greater heterogeneity, not greater homogeneity.
This evidently is true at any given location, as more and more ways of
life learn to coexist, and it is also true globally, as cultural interpenetration multiplies the number of permutations and, in the process, creates
new ways of life, new cultures. This increased diversity has, in turn,
led to an acceleration in creativity and innovation. The explosive
growth of knowledge and technology in the last fifty years has greatly
contributed to significant advances in human development and to the
rapid pace of economic growth worldwide.
The cultural aspect of globalization ultimately may be more significant than other features of the process that receive so much attention,
namely, the rapid growth of international trade, the investments by
transnational corporations, the huge flows of financial capital, the
migration of labor, and the political and institutional transformations
occurring at supranational levels. Cultural interpenetration is especially critical because it implies cultural exchange, which, in turn,
implies diversity, heterogeneity, and a shattering of mental and con-
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ceptual boundaries. This results in cultural vitality for all concerned; in
aesthetic, scientific, and technological creativity; and in economic
expansion. Indeed, it is quite possible that cultural exchange is one of
the roots, perhaps the principal root, of global dynamism and is, therefore, the ultimate source of human creativity and development, as well
as economic growth. 嘷
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